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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his important book, Animating Civil Procedure, Professor Michael Vitiello 
demonstrates the power of procedure.1 His theme, put simply, is that substantive 
rights are worthless unless there is some effective avenue for enforcing them. The 
traditional avenue of enforcement is civil litigation. A gatekeeper of that avenue is 
personal jurisdiction. Without personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff simply cannot get 
into court; she cannot vindicate her claims and the community cannot benefit from 
private enforcement of the law. 
The principal case guiding the state-court exercise of personal jurisdiction is 
 
* Candler Professor of Law, Emory University. It is a privilege to participate in this Symposium honoring 
my friend Mike Vitiello. 
1.  MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE (2018) [hereinafter VITIELLO]. 
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the iconic 1945 decision International Shoe Company v. Washington.2 The 
Supreme Court’s efforts to interpret and apply the International Shoe test during 
the second half of the twentieth century were notoriously inconsistent and 
frustrating. That century ended with a flurry of cases in the 1980s and one in 1990 
that featured an inability to muster majority opinions on fundamental questions 
and a tendency toward restrictive views of state-court power. 
When the Court returned to personal jurisdiction in 2011, after a 21-year 
hiatus, observers were hopeful that it would remedy the doctrinal shortcomings 
with which it had left us. From 2011 through 2017, the Court decided six personal 
jurisdiction cases, which constitute what we can call the “new era.”3 With no 
personal jurisdiction cases on the Supreme Court’s immediate horizon, it is a good 
time to take stock. Doing so reveals that the law of personal jurisdiction today, 
while in some ways clearer, is more sclerotic than it was at the turn of the century. 
In his concurrence in International Shoe, Justice Black warned that the doctrine 
announced in that decision might be used limit plaintiff’s access to courts.  Though 
his warning now seems prescient, the limited scope of personal jurisdiction in the 
new era results not from the importation of flexible standards, as Black feared, but 
from an obsession with the defendants’ intent to form a tie with the forum state.   
II. WRITING ON A BLANK SLATE: JUSTICE BLACK’S MELANGE APPROACH 
The most famous phrase in the law of personal jurisdiction, memorized by 
countless law students, is from International Shoe. After discussing the historic 
grounding of personal jurisdiction in a court’s de facto power over the person of 
the defendant, which required that the defendant be served with process in the 
forum, the Court explained that in the modern view: 
due process requires only that . . . to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.4 
At least three things were clear from the outset of the modern approach.  First, 
there must be some contact between the defendant and the forum. The Court 
expressly recognized that there can be no personal jurisdiction in a state in which 
the defendant has no “contacts, ties, or relations.”5 
 
2.  326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
3.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 
S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 
564 U.S. 873 (2011).  
4.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5.  Id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878)). 
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Second, “fair play and substantial justice”—what came to be called 
“reasonableness”—is part of the personal jurisdiction calculus. This was 
something new and potentially liberating from the power-based regime of 
Pennoyer v. Neff.6 
Third, though the Court did not use the terms, it recognized (albeit not in the 
language quoted above) the concepts of what came to be called “general” and 
“specific” personal jurisdiction.7 With specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff asserts a 
claim that arises from or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. With 
general (or “all purpose”)8 jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s claim does not relate to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum. 
The Court did not give much guidance on these three matters in International 
Shoe itself. On contact, for instance, it did not discuss how volitional, direct, or 
foreseeable the defendant’s affiliation with the forum must be. Regarding fairness, 
the Court did not prescribe relevant factors for the assessment, nor did it explain 
how reasonableness of jurisdiction interacts with the requirement that the 
defendant have a contact with the forum. Regarding general jurisdiction, the Court 
recognized that sometimes a defendant’s contacts with the forum would be so 
“continuous and systematic” as to justify jurisdiction for a claim unrelated to those 
contacts. But it did not define continuous or systematic.9 On all three fronts, then, 
International Shoe left a blank slate. 
Justice Black was the first Justice to write on that slate. In his concurrence in 
International Shoe—which reads much more like a dissent—he saw no need for 
the Court’s broad restatement of relevant principles.10 Under the “solicitation plus” 
rule fashioned by the state and lower federal courts, the defendant shoe company 
was unquestionably subject to in personam jurisdiction in Washington.11 Black 
was especially bothered by the injection of “elastic standards” and “vague . . . 
criteria”—phrases like “fair play” and “substantial justice,” “estimate of the 
inconveniences,” “reasonableness,” and the “quality and nature” of defendant’s 
activities.12 He explained: 
 
6.  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714. 
7.  See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate 
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of 
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”). 
8.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“all-purpose 
jurisdiction” as another rubric for general jurisdiction). 
9.  For example, is the level of activity to be measured by objective criteria, such as the generation of a 
certain number of dollars in revenue in a given year? Or is it assessed on a relative scale, such as a certain 
percentage of the defendant’s overall business? The Court has not wrestled with such questions, though in 
Daimler it concluded that activities-based general jurisdiction over a corporation must be based upon that 
company’s overall level of business, and not by comparing it to other businesses in the forum state.  See infra 
note 74.   
10.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322–26 (Black, J., concurring).  
11.  The issue was so clear that Justice Black would have “dismiss[ed] the appeal as unsubstantial.” Id. at 
322 (footnote omitted). 
12.  Id. at 323–25.  
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There is a strong emotional appeal in the words “fair play,” “justice,” and 
“reasonableness.” But they were not chosen by those who wrote the 
original Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for 
this Court to use in invalidating State or Federal laws passed by elected 
legislative representatives.13 
Black was worried that federal courts, including the Supreme Court, would use 
such open-ended concepts to restrict states’ exercise of personal jurisdiction. And 
he left no doubt as to the unconstitutionality of the federal judiciary’s invalidation 
of state-court jurisdiction based upon open-ended concepts of convenience: 
None of the cases purport to support or could support a holding that a State 
can tax and sue corporations only if its action comports with this Court’s 
notions of “natural justice.” I should have thought the Tenth Amendment 
settled that.14 
After deciding International Shoe, the Court stood aside for five years to allow 
state courts and lower federal courts to apply and interpret the new standard. When 
the Court returned, Justice Black took charge to ensure that International Shoe 
would be read expansively. If we were stuck with elastic terms, he seemed to think, 
let us use them to extend personal jurisdiction. His efforts dealt with specific, and 
not general, jurisdiction. 
The first honest-to-goodness specific personal jurisdiction case applying the 
International Shoe test15 was Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,16 which has 
been overlooked through the years. In that case, the Court upheld a Virginia statute 
that required out-of-state businesses to obtain a license before offering to sell 
securities in the Commonwealth. The statute required such a company to appoint 
a state officer as its agent for service of process in Virginia. Travelers, a nonprofit 
health insurance company formed and operating in Nebraska, did not comply with 
the Virginia statute. It had never advertised or used paid agents in Virginia. Instead, 
it relied on recommendations from existing members; when a member 
recommended someone for coverage, Travelers would solicit that person by mail. 
The company had done this in Virginia for over 40 years, which resulted in its 
having 800 members there.17 
 
13.  Id. at 325 (Black, J., concurring). 
14.  Id. at 324 (Black, J., concurring). He continued: “Nor can I stretch the meaning of due process so far 
as to authorize this Court to deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens on the ground 
that it would be more ‘convenient’ for the corporation to be sued somewhere else.” Id. at 325. 
15.  Earlier cases cited International Shoe, but none had undertaken to apply the minimum contacts test to 
determine whether personal jurisdiction was proper. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 
574–75 (1949) (citing International Shoe for the proposition that corporations are entitled to Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection). 
16.  339 U.S. 643 (1950). 
17.  Id. at 645–46.  
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The Virginia Corporation Commission filed a cease-and-desist action against 
the company and one of its officers. The Court upheld enforcement of the 
regulatory provision that required the company to accept service on the state 
official.18  Justice Black’s discussion of personal jurisdiction under International 
Shoe comprises three paragraphs. From the first sentence, he established that 
“contact” and what came to be known as “reasonableness” are to be assessed 
together, in no set order: “[T]he contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia 
residents, together with that state’s interest in faithful observance of the certificate 
obligations, justify subjecting appellants to cease and desist proceedings. . . .”19 He 
then addressed the company’s in-state solicitation of business, and raised the 
notion of a quid pro quo between gaining a benefit and being subjected to personal 
jurisdiction: 
[The company’s] insurance certificates, systematically and widely 
delivered in Virginia following solicitation based on recommendations of 
Virginians, create continuing obligations between the Association and 
each of the many certificate holders in the state. Appellants have caused 
claims for losses to be investigated and the Virginia courts were available 
to them in seeking to enforce obligations created by the group of 
certificates.20 
Justice Black then faced the open-ended notion of fairness and employed it in 
favor of jurisdiction. He stressed fairness to the plaintiff by noting that many claims 
against the insurance company would be so small that Virginia consumers would 
not find it worthwhile to litigate in the defendant’s home state. Either Virginia 
claimants get to litigate in Virginia or they will not be able to litigate at all.21 
Next, he expressly incorporated factors from a forum non conveniens analysis. 
Virginia was the center of gravity, “where witnesses would most likely live and 
where claims for losses would presumably be investigated.”22 Again, he 
emphasized fairness to the plaintiff in being able to seek redress at home.23 He 
coupled the plaintiff’s interest with the forum state’s interest in protecting “its 
citizens from . . . injustice.”24 
Seven years later, Justice Black wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court in 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.25 In that case, a Californian bought life 
 
18.  Id. at 647–48. 
19.  Id. at 648. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Travelers Health Ass’n, 339 U.S. at 649 (“[C]laims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders 
could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit.”). 
22.  Id. (“Such factors have been given great weight in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens”). 
23.  Id. (explaining it is unfair to require plaintiffs to “seek redress only in some distant state where the 
insurer is incorporated”).  
24.  Id.  
25.  355 U.S. 220 (1957). Though the opinion was unanimous, only eight Justices participated. Chief Justice 
Warren recused. Id. at 224–25.  
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insurance from an Arizona company. A Texas company acquired the Arizona 
insurer.  The law required the Texas company to honor the Californian’s insurance 
policy. It mailed a re-insurance certificate to the insured, who continued to pay 
premiums by mail from California. After the insured died, the company refused 
payment on the policy. The beneficiary of the policy sued in California, the 
company failed to defend, and the California trial court entered a default judgment. 
The Court held that Texas was required to extend full faith and credit to the 
California default judgment. 
In one paragraph, Justice Black upheld personal jurisdiction in California, 
again mixing facts relating to contact, the forum state’s interest, the plaintiff’s 
interest, and forum non conveniens factors.26 Two aspects of the McGee opinion 
are especially noteworthy. First, Black adopted a broad view of what constitutes a 
relevant contact under International Shoe. Due process was satisfied because “the 
suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with [the forum] 
State.”27 In other words, the relationship between the parties, and not simply the 
acts of the defendant, might provide sufficient “minimum contacts” with the 
forum. Moreover, jurisdiction was proper even though the record indicated that the 
insurer had “never solicited or done any insurance business in California apart 
from the policy involved [in the case].”28 
Second, though suit in California would impose a burden on the corporate 
defendant, that burden was less severe than requiring the impecunious beneficiary 
to sue in Texas. Black weighed the relative inconvenience to the litigants, noting 
that Californians “would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow 
the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.”29 
Because interstate business was becoming increasingly routine, commercial 
defendants should expect to be subject to suit in multiple states.30 Moreover, 
California had “a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its 
residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.”31 
With Travelers Health and McGee, Black steered the Court on a liberal course 
regarding the application of International Shoe. First, the approach did not treat 
contact and fairness separately. It was a mélange, in which facts demonstrating the 
defendants’ contact with the forum and facts supporting the reasonableness of 
 
26.  Id. at 223. Though the insurer sent the certificate of re-insurance to the insured in California, and to 
that extent solicited business from that state, “[n]othing in the opinion suggested that jurisdiction turned on [that] 
fact.” VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 26. Professor Vitiello notes that the outcome would have been the same had the 
insured reached out to the Texas insurer to request an update to his policy. The Court “did not suggest that the 
result turned on who solicited whom. The focus of the analysis was on modern transportation and communication. 
In light of those realities, at least a large corporate defendant could not claim that it lacked an opportunity to be 
heard. Indeed, Justice Black seemed to equate due process with adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard.” 
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). 
27.  McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
28.  Id. at 222.  
29.  Id. at 223. 
30.  Id. at 222–23. 
31.  Id. at 223. 
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exercising jurisdiction were mixed. Second, the approach gave content to the open-
ended elastic terms regarding whether jurisdiction was fair. Specifically, it 
appealed to the state’s interest in providing a courtroom for a citizen harmed by 
the nonresident defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in seeking justice at home and 
avoiding suing in a distant state, the efficiency of litigating where the witnesses 
may be found, and the need for a convenient forum for the assertion of negative-
value claims. Clearly, the Court envisioned that defendants engaged in far-flung 
business activities would be amenable to suit in multiple states. 
Notably, factors relating to the fairness of jurisdiction—forum non conveniens 
factors—could be marshaled to support jurisdiction. In McGee, for instance, 
California had an interest in providing a forum for its citizen, who allegedly was 
harmed by the out-of-state insurer. The plaintiff had an interest in suing at home. 
And the balance of convenience dictated that the defendant insurer could litigate 
in the plaintiff’s home state.  
In McGee, decided on December 16, 1958, no Justice dissented from the free-
ranging approach combining matters of contact with matters of fairness. Less than 
seven months later, however, on June 23, 1958, with no change in personnel on 
the Court, only four Justices would embrace the mélange approach. 
III. A RIVAL APPROACH 
In Hanson v. Denckla,32 another specific jurisdiction case, the Court took a 
radical turn. The Court split five-to-four, with Chief Justice Warren writing for the 
Court and Justice Black dissenting. Suddenly, factors supporting reasonableness 
of jurisdiction took a back seat to whether the defendant had created a sufficient 
contact with the forum. The requirement of contact focused exclusively on actions 
by the defendant, and not (as had been the case in McGee) on whether the 
relationship between the parties had some connection with the forum. Hanson 
introduced the requirement of “purposeful availment”:33 there can be no personal 
jurisdiction without the defendant’s volitional engagement of the forum. The 
contact between the forum and the defendant must be forged by the defendant 
itself, and not by the “unilateral act of a third party.”34 
Overnight, then, the Court’s focus shifted from the forum and its interests to 
the defendant and acts by which it can be said to have reached out to the forum. 
Implicit in the requirement of purposeful availment is the idea that a defendant 
should be able to control, to limit, the fora in which it will be subject to personal 
jurisdiction. Moreover, personal jurisdiction involves more than protecting 
 
32.  357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
33.  Id. at 253 (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”).  
34.  Id. (“The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot 
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.”). 
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defendants from litigation in distant places. The due process limits on personal 
jurisdiction are “more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the 
respective States.”35 
Why the reversal of approach? Hanson was nasty litigation between siblings 
concerning inheritance. Finding that the trustee was subject to personal jurisdiction 
in Florida would have rewarded the seemingly avaricious siblings over the 
seemingly virtuous one. Eschewing the opportunity to decide the case on 
alternative grounds,36 the Court defeated the greedy siblings by limiting personal 
jurisdiction. It was an example of a bad case making bad law.37 Despite the new 
tack, the Court did not purport in Hanson to overrule the mélange approach 
pioneered by Black. 
After Hanson, the Court ignored in personam jurisdiction for 21 years.38 State 
and lower federal courts were left to make sense of the conflicting signals. Most 
courts appeared to embrace the liberal mélange approach of Travelers Health and 
McGee and to ignore Hanson as a sport.39 Those years—the 1960s and 1970s—
featured increased interstate commerce. More than before, products or components 
manufactured in one state were marketed in, and causing harm in, distant states. 
State common law in these years developed cutting-edge theories of product 
liability. With this expansion of liability came expansive exercises of personal 
jurisdiction, often supported by the mélange factors set out by Black and ignoring 
a need for purposeful availment by the defendant.40 
IV. THE 1980S THROUGH 1990 AND THE HEGEMONY OF HANSON 
The Court returned to in personam jurisdiction in 1980 and, over the next 
decade, left no doubt as to which approach won. In World-Wide Volkswagen,41 
 
35.  Id. at 251. 
36.  It could have dismissed the case on grounds of failure to join an indispensable party. Id. at 254–55. 
37.  Professor Vitiello makes this point and recounts the fascinating backstory of the litigation in VITIELLO, 
supra note 1, at 28–32. 
38.  The one case of consequence between 1958 and 1980 was Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), 
which concerned in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.  
39.  VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 31 (“Many courts ignored Hanson for about twenty years. Taken seriously, 
it presented a serious challenge to courts interested in expanding the reach of state court jurisdiction over out-of-
state corporations causing harm in-state.”). 
40.  The best-known example is Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 68 (Ill. 
1961), in which the Illinois Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation based upon a 
stream-of-commerce theory. The court was willing to assume that the company’s products were marketed and 
used in significant quantities in the forum state, though the record did not contain evidence of such purposeful 
availment. From the record, it appeared that the defendant’s product was shipped into the forum by the unilateral 
act of a third party (the manufacturer of a finished product that contained a component made by the defendant). 
Thus, under Hanson, it is unlikely that the forum would have had personal jurisdiction. See VITIELLO, supra note 
1, at 31. 
41.  444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980). 
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decided in 1980, the Court split the International Shoe inquiry into discrete parts: 
contact and fairness/reasonableness. Beyond this, it established the primacy of 
contact. There must be a relevant contact between the defendant and the forum 
before a court will consider factors relating to the reasonableness of jurisdiction.  
Moreover, as to contact, the Court embraced the Hanson definition: a relevant 
contact is one that arises from the defendant’s purposeful availment. 
This World-Wide methodology effectively ended the mélange approach.  Now, 
fairness topics such as the state’s interest, the plaintiff’s interest, the forum non 
conveniens factors can be assessed only after a court finds that the defendant forged 
a purposeful contact with the forum. 
The Court confirmed the secondary status of the reasonableness analysis in 
Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz,42 which was the only personal jurisdiction case in 
which Justice Brennan wrote a majority opinion.43 In that case, the Court imposed 
a presumption: once the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant has forged a 
purposeful contact with the forum, the exercise of jurisdiction is presumed to be 
reasonable. The burden shifts to the defendant to “present a compelling case” that 
jurisdiction is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [he] is at a severe 
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”44 Further interring notions of 
fairness that had been relevant in McGee, Burger King established that a defendant 
“may not defeat jurisdiction simply because of his adversary’s greater net worth.”45 
Burger King, with its presumption and shifting burdens of proof, makes it all 
but impossible to defeat jurisdiction by relying on the fairness factors. The only 
case in which the Court rejected jurisdiction—despite contact—because it was 
unreasonable was Asahi Metal Co. v. Superior Court.46 But that was an easy case. 
By the time it got to the Court, it was an “F-Cubed” dispute: foreign plaintiff, 
foreign defendant, with a claim that arose overseas. There was no reason for an 
 
42.  471 U.S. 462 (1985). It is ironic that he imposed the lock-step test that hampers access to an assessment 
of reasonableness. Brennan had long and unsuccessfully urged the mélange approach of Justice Black. See 
Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 551 (2012) [hereinafter Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century].  
43.  Brennan had long been an advocate of the mélange approach to International Shoe. To get the 
opportunity to write for the majority, in Burger King he agreed to embrace the two-step regime adumbrated in 
World-Wide. It is his ironic legacy he imposed a presumption in favor of jurisdiction that has contributed to the 
current judicial obsession with the contact requirement. See Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century, 
supra note 42, at 553. In fairness, Justice Brennan used the opportunity to slip into the International Shoe calculus 
a sliding-scale approach: if the reasonableness factors strongly favored jurisdiction, it might be upheld based upon 
a lesser showing of contact.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (“These [fairness] considerations sometimes serve to 
establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be 
required.”). This “forced linkage” of the contact and fairness prongs of analysis should make it difficult to dismiss 
on the basis of lack of contact without at least considering the fairness factors. Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to 
Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Super. Ct., 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 775 (1988). In no subsequent 
case has the Court referred to this sliding-scale approach, much less applied it.  
44.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478. 
45.  Id. at 483 n.25. 
46.  480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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American court to hear it. Indeed, it could have been dismissed without harm to 
personal jurisdiction doctrine on the basis of forum non conveniens.47 In the 
common domestic case, Burger King will almost never counsel rejection of 
jurisdiction based upon the fairness factors. 
The remainder of the twentieth century was marked by two particularly 
shambolic efforts. In Asahi, the Court failed to muster a majority opinion on what 
constitutes purposeful availment, and therefore a relevant contact, in stream of 
commerce cases.48 And in Burnham v. Superior Court,49 it failed to generate a 
majority opinion for whether service of process on the defendant in the forum state 
supports general jurisdiction, independent of International Shoe.50 
In routine domestic cases of specific jurisdiction, the International Shoe 
assessment was dominated by a concern with contact; reasonableness was pushed 
to a distant second position. After Burger King, the reasonableness inquiry had 
become a brake—it could defeat jurisdiction but was not used (as it had been in 
Travelers Health and McGee51) to support jurisdiction.52 The focus was contact, as 
shown by cases like World-Wide, Asahi, Calder v. Jones,53 and Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine.54 And contact, in turn, was narrowly focused on defendant’s purposeful 
acts. The unilateral act of a third party, even the plaintiff, could not establish a 
sufficient tie between the defendant and the forum. In sum, the process had become 
defendant-centric. 
Any resulting sclerosis in specific jurisdiction was perhaps offset by a rather 
robust exercise of general jurisdiction. In International Shoe, the Court noted that 
a defendant’s contact with the forum could be so great as to justify personal 
jurisdiction for claims that did not arise from that contact. The phrase that stuck 
was that general jurisdiction was appropriate if the defendant had forged 
 
47.  Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 
9, 19 (1988). 
48.  Four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, found it sufficient that a defendant placed its product into the 
stream of commerce with the reasonable anticipation that it would be marketed in a particular state. Asahi, 480 
U.S. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring). Four others, led by Justice O’Connor, concluded that something more was 
needed to show an “intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.” Id. at 110 (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion). Justice Stevens saw no need to adopt the reasoning of either camp. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
49.  495 U.S. 605 (1990). 
50.  Justice Scalia, speaking for four Justices, concluded that it did. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
Justice Brennan, also speaking for four Justices, opined that the case must be assessed under International Shoe. 
Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring). Again, Justice Stevens refused to take sides, and thwarted a majority opinion 
one way or the other. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). Some observers wonder aloud whether the Court stopped 
taking personal jurisdiction cases in 1990 because Justice Stevens would continue to thwart majority opinions. In 
fact, the Court did not decide another personal jurisdiction case until 2011, after Justice Stevens had retired. 
51.  McGee is the last case in which the Court relied extensively on fairness factors to uphold jurisdiction.  
52.  After Hanson, the Court’s only extended discussions of the fairness factors for the remainder of the 
20th century came in Burger King and Asahi. In both cases, the outcome hinged on the assessment of whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. In Burger King, the answer was yes. In Asahi, the answer was no, 
because—as noted in text—the dispute had become an F-Cubed case. 
53.  465 U.S. 783 (1984) (finding contact in a defamation case). 
54.  465 U.S. 770 (1984) (finding contact in a defamation case).  
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“continuous and systematic” ties with the forum. 
In this area, the Court left big questions open, but the state and lower federal 
courts seemed to develop a coherent doctrine. The classic case, Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co.,55 decided in 1952, was easy. A mining company that 
could not engage in mining in the Philippines because of World War II conducted 
whatever needed to be done from an officer’s home in Ohio. Everyone had always 
agreed that a corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state of 
its incorporation. Perkins reached the common-sense conclusion that a corporation 
should be subject to general personal jurisdiction in the single state in which it 
undertook business activities.56 Again, though, the Court employed the phrase 
“continuous and systematic” as the test for what level of activity in-forum would 
support general personal jurisdiction.57 
The Court’s other twentieth century effort regarding general jurisdiction was 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,58 which held that a Colombian 
charter air transportation company was not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. 
The Court again embraced the “continuous and systematic” rubric, though it did 
little to help define the phrase. Curiously, the Court relied upon Rosenberg 
Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., which held—23 years before International 
Shoe—that purchases and related trips, standing alone, cannot support general 
jurisdiction.59 
While cases at the margins were irreconcilable, state and lower federal courts 
forged common understandings of what constituted “continuous and systematic” 
activity.60 The idea that general jurisdiction was proper based upon a business’s 
substantial commercial contacts with the forum was so commonplace that many 
companies simply never challenged such all-purpose power over them. As just one 
example, in Ferens v. John Deere Co., the defendant, a Delaware corporation, 
never thought to challenge the exercise of general jurisdiction over it in 
Mississippi.61 
V. THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW ERA 
Now let us move to the new era, which consists of six cases decided from 2011 
 
55.  342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
56.  Id. at 447–48. 
57.  Id. at 448. 
58.  466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
59.  260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923). 
60.  Compare Bryant v. Finnish Nat’l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441–42 (N.Y. 1965) (finding general 
jurisdiction based upon the airline’s maintenance of a one-and-a-half room office in the forum state and 
employment of several people at that office), with Follette v. Clairol, 829 F. Supp. 840, 845–46 (W.D. La. 1993) 
(rejecting general jurisdiction over Wal-Mart despite its operation of 264 retail stores in the forum state). 
61.  494 U.S. 516, 520 (1990).  
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through 2017. Others have ably described and mostly criticized these cases.62 My 
purpose here is to summarize three characteristics of this new era: (1) the continued 
hegemony of contact, (2) the evisceration of general jurisdiction, and (3) increased 
focus on relatedness. 
A. The Continued Hegemony of Contact 
The need for a defendant-initiated contact with the forum continues to 
dominate specific jurisdiction. The proof is the stunning decision in J. McIntyre. 
There, an English manufacturer sold machines to an Ohio distributor with 
instructions to sell as many machines as possible throughout North America. The 
distributor sold a machine to a company in New Jersey. Plaintiff, working for that 
New Jersey company, was severely injured while using the machine on the job in 
New Jersey. The Court held that the plaintiff could not sue the English corporation 
in his home state. 
The result in J. McIntyre shows how far the Court has moved from Justice 
Black’s mélange approach. Black would have noted that the forum state had a 
strong interest in protecting its citizen, as well as a legitimate interest in workplace 
safety. He would have noted the plaintiff’s interest in suing at home. The fact that 
witnesses to the installation and use of the machine, to the accident, and concerning 
the medical issues would all be in New Jersey would support jurisdiction. So would 
the fact that the substantive claim would likely be governed by New Jersey law.  
And the balance of burdens mirrors McGee—it is more difficult to make the 
plaintiff travel (especially to Great Britain) than to expect the company to defend 
in a state in which its product is used (and from which, therefore, it had made 
money). 
In the twenty-first century, those factors are entirely irrelevant. They are 
fairness factors, and a plaintiff cannot appeal to them until she demonstrates that 
the defendant forged a purposeful-availment contact with the forum. In McIntyre, 
as in Asahi, the Court failed to muster a majority opinion on what constitutes 
purposeful availment in a stream-of-commerce case. Six justices held that there 
was no contact between the English company and New Jersey. The plurality 
opinion, by Justice Kennedy for four Justices, and the concurring opinion by 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, cobbled together the six votes against 
jurisdiction.63 
I have never understood why a simple economic observation does not solve 
 
62.  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 
78 LA. L. REV. 739, 747–59 (2018); Adam R. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2018). 
63.  It is possible that the Court will ultimately adopt a broad view of contact in stream-of-commerce cases. 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence, joined by Justice Alito, refused to take sides between the position staked out by 
Justice Kennedy on the one hand, and Justice Ginsburg on the other. By keeping their powder dry, Breyer and 
Alito may in an appropriate case join the dissenters from J. McIntyre in embracing a liberal view of what 
constitutes contact in these cases.  
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the purposeful availment issue in stream-of-commerce cases. When a 
manufacturer such as J. McIntyre sells through a distributor, and places no limits 
on distribution, any sale by the distributor will bring financial benefit to the 
manufacturer. Stated another way, J. McIntyre made money from the fact that there 
was a market in New Jersey for its machine. If no market existed, J. McIntyre 
would not have sold the machine that injured the plaintiff. The English company 
made money from New Jersey on the sale of that one machine, which should 
constitute purposeful availment of that state. 
But the six Justices who rejected jurisdiction in J. McIntyre were dogged in 
finding that the English company did not have a relevant connection with New 
Jersey. They showed their doggedness through a remarkable set of hypotheticals. 
Justice Kennedy worried that a small Florida farmer who sells produce through a 
middleman for national distribution “could be sued in Alaska or any number of 
other States’ courts without ever leaving town.”64 Justice Breyer expressed concern 
that an Appalachian potter selling through a distributor might be haled into court 
in Hawaii to answer for a defective coffee mug.65 Or a Kenyan coffee grower or 
Egyptian shirt-maker, selling through an American distributor, might be sued in 
any state.66 
With respect, these Justices miss the boat. The answer in these cases is not to 
strain to find that the defendant has no contact with the forum. The answer is to let 
the fairness factors do some of the work. Yes, the Florida farmer selling through a 
distributor has a contact with Alaska. But on the facts of a given case, jurisdiction 
in Alaska would not be fair. Yes, the Appalachian potter selling through a 
distributor has a contact with Hawaii, but no court will ever conclude that 
jurisdiction in Hawaii—arising from a single defective coffee mug—would be 
reasonable. The Kenyan coffee grower and Egyptian shirt maker has a contact with 
many states in the United States, but jurisdiction in any of them might be 
unreasonable, depending upon the facts. 
 Once we recognize that there is a relevant contact, the reasonableness prong 
of International Shoe puts the ultimate conclusion in the hands of the fairness 
factors—to uphold jurisdiction in McIntyre and to reject it as to the Appalachian 
potter. But, as it has since World-Wide, the Court continues to refuse to assess such 
factors until a case satisfies its increasingly narrow view of a relevant contact 
between the defendant and the forum. Justice Black’s appeal to reasonableness is 
as futile now as it has been since 1980. 
Indeed, in some ways the situation seems worse now. At least in Asahi, the 
Court was willing to consider the possibility that the fairness factors might counsel 
against jurisdiction. In J. McIntyre, neither the plurality nor concurring opinion 
entertained the possibility in their respective hypothetical cases that the 
 
64.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
65.  Id. at 891–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
66.  Id. at 892 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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reasonableness factors come into play at all—to support or to defeat jurisdiction. 
Moreover, with Daimler, Justice Ginsburg, who had once supported a mélange 
method, embraced the rigid two-step approach from World-Wide, which gives 
primacy of place to contact.67 
At the end of the century, there was a safety valve: the plaintiff could invoke 
general jurisdiction in a state in which the defendant had continuous and systematic 
contacts. In McIntyre, then, the plaintiff presumably could sue the English 
company in Ohio, because it had such ties with that state. After all, every machine 
it sold in North America was sold and shipped to that state, which would seem to 
satisfy the continuous and systematic requirement. Now, however, even this 
avenue is restricted significantly by the second characteristic of the new era. 
B.  The Restriction of General Jurisdiction 
Three of the six cases in the new era—Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF—
addressed general jurisdiction. They have changed the doctrine profoundly. 
Instead of permitting all-purpose jurisdiction in any state in which the defendant 
has continuous and systematic ties, now it is allowed only in which the defendant 
is “essentially at home.”68 
The view of “essentially at home” is quite narrow. In Helicopteros, as we saw, 
the Court held that the plaintiff cannot base general jurisdiction on the defendant’s 
continuous and systematic purchases from the forum.69 In Goodyear, the Court 
extended the ban to prohibit general jurisdiction based upon the defendant’s 
continuous and systematic sales into the forum.70 Justice Ginsburg gave two 
“paradigms” of where a corporation may be considered “essentially at home”: (1) 
its state of incorporation and (2) the state in which it has its principal place of 
business (which the Court seems to consider its nerve center).71 The implication, 
plainly, is that a corporation72 will be subject to general personal jurisdiction in a 
maximum of two states. 
 
67.  I have always thought that Ginsburg’s dissent in J. McIntyre, by giving “prime place to reason and 
fairness,” id. at 903, was consistent with the mélange test of McGee. Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First 
Century, supra note 42, at 584. In her opinion for the Court in Daimler, however, she noted that specific 
jurisdiction is governed by the two-step analysis of World-Wide, in which reasonableness is consulted only after 
a contact is established. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014). There, she also rejected the idea 
that the assessment of reasonableness is a “free-floating test.” Id.  
68.  The phrase first appears in this context in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 924 (2011). The Court has applied it in the two more recent general jurisdiction cases, sometimes using the 
term “at home” instead of “essentially at home.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); Daimler, 
571 U.S. at 136. 
69.  See supra note 59. 
70.  See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930 n.6 (“[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not 
justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.”). 
71.  Id. at 924–25. 
72.  In no case has the Court opined on where an unincorporated business, such as a limited liability 
company, be “essentially at home.” 
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In Goodyear, the Court gave lip service to the possibility that a corporation 
could be subject to general jurisdiction in other states based upon its activities 
there.73 Again, though, the plaintiff cannot base general jurisdiction on the 
defendant’s purchases or sales in the forum. And, the subsequent cases make clear, 
any activities-based general jurisdiction will exist in, at most, only one state.74 
More pointedly, activities-based general jurisdiction will exist only on facts such 
as those in Perkins75—the facts of which were sui generis. When the smoke clears, 
activities-based general jurisdiction is dead.76 General jurisdiction over 
corporations has been limited to at most two states, which is significantly narrower 
than it was at the close of the twentieth century. 
Even more relevant to our study is the fact that in Daimler the Court held that 
the reasonableness analysis of International Shoe is irrelevant in general 
jurisdiction. The Court dropped this stunning news in a footnote.77 The parties had 
not argued or briefed the issue. Thus, today, once a court finds that the defendant 
is “essentially at home”—which it defined very narrowly to start with—that is the 
end of the matter. The fairness factors play no role. 
For all appearances, then, general jurisdiction (over corporations anyway) is 
significantly narrower today than it has been for 50 years.78 As Justice Sotomayor 
lamented in BNSF: “What was once a holistic, nuanced contacts analysis backed 
by considerations of fairness and reasonableness has now effectively been replaced 
by the rote identification of a corporation’s principal place of business or place of 
incorporation.”79 
This fact creates special problems for American plaintiffs suing foreign 
defendants. A foreign company will not be formed or have its decision-making 
 
73.  See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation 
may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; 
it simply typed those placed paradigm all-purpose forums.”); see also id. at 139 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the 
possibility that in an exceptional case, a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of 
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation 
at home in that State.”). 
74.  This conclusion flows from the Court’s statement in Daimler that “[g]eneral jurisdiction . . . calls for 
an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.” Id. at 139 n.20. It is not 
enough that a company does business in a state comparable to that of local companies. Instead, the inquiry is 
whether the activities in that state constitute a significant proportion of the company’s overall business. See 
Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns With the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L. REV. 1161, 1171–74 
(2015). 
75.  BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (identifying Perkins as an “exceptional case” 
in which general jurisdiction might be based upon business activities in the forum). 
76.  As Justice Sotomayor concluded in her dissent in BNSF, “it is virtually inconceivable that [interstate] 
corporations will ever be subject to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business 
or incorporation.” Id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
77.  Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20.  
78.  See Judith Cornett & Michael Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal 
Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015) (state and lower federal courts for decades 
before the new era based general jurisdiction on continuous and systematic business activities in the forum). 
79.  BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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apparatus in the United States. So general jurisdiction will be available only in the 
foreign country. The combination of a narrow form of specific jurisdiction with 
the newly narrowed general jurisdiction results in telling American plaintiffs such 
as Mr. Nicastro in J. McIntyre that they must seek justice in the courts of a foreign 
country—even for injuries suffered in the United States.80 Justice Black’s mélange 
approach would not have permitted such a result. 
C. The New Focus on Relatedness in Specific Jurisdiction Cases 
The third characteristic of the new era in personal jurisdiction flows from the 
recent restriction on general personal jurisdiction. That restriction creates a gap. 
Into that gap falls cases that would have invoked general jurisdiction based upon 
“continuous and systematic” activity in-forum, but now will not. Such cases must 
be handled through specific jurisdiction. The problem in these cases will not be 
contact; indeed, defendants will have plenty of contact with the forum. The 
problem—the new battleground in specific jurisdiction—is relatedness. 
We see the problem in Bristol-Myers Squibb. Here is something new: a 
specific jurisdiction case in which the fight was not over whether the defendant 
had a relevant contact with the forum state. The company had so much contact 
with California—research and laboratory facilities, 160 employees, 250 sales 
representatives, a lobbying force, and it sold millions of Plavix pills there—that 
many courts before the new era would have exercised general jurisdiction. General 
jurisdiction is now impossible, however, because the company is neither 
incorporated nor headquartered in California.  
The problem was relatedness: the claims by non-California plaintiffs were not 
sufficiently affiliated with the defendant’s contacts with the forum to qualify for 
specific jurisdiction. In 1984, in his dissent in Helicopteros, Justice Brennan 
suggested that the line between general and specific jurisdiction was nuanced. He 
pointed out the difference between a requirement that the plaintiff’s claim “arise 
out of” the defendant’s contact with the forum and that it “relate to” that contact.81 
The latter phrase, Brennan suggested, should require a lesser connection with the 
forum than the former. 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court employed the phrase “arise from or relate 
to,”82 with no suggestion that there might be a distinction between the two. There 
 
80.  The problem is even worse for Americans harmed by foreign entities abroad. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339, creates a civil-rights claim for citizens of the United States injured or killed abroad by 
acts of terrorism. The current restriction on general jurisdiction makes it impossible to pursue a claim based upon 
general jurisdiction against organizations such as the Palestinian Authority, because they are not “essentially at 
home” anywhere in the United States. See, e.g., Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 335 (2d 
Cir. 2017). Perhaps courts will facilitate jurisdiction in such cases by interpreting the Fifth Amendment more 
broadly than the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ariel Winawer, Comment, Too Far From Home: Why Daimler’s 
“At Home” Standard Does Not Apply to Personal Jurisdiction Challenges in Anti-Terrorism Act Cases, 66 
EMORY L.J. 161 (2016). 
81.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
82.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
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is no sliding scale based upon the amount of contact between Defendant and the 
forum; either there is relatedness or there is not. The pills that allegedly harmed 
the non-California plaintiffs were not manufactured, packaged, labeled, or sold in 
California. They were not prescribed or ingested in California, and no harm was 
suffered (by the non-Californians) in California. Accordingly, the non-
Californians’ claims were not sufficiently affiliated with the defendant’s California 
contacts. Apparently, for specific jurisdiction the very product that causes harm 
must have some connection to the forum. The fact that the identical product is sold 
in all states is irrelevant. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb raises another barrier between plaintiffs and access to 
the factors concerning the reasonableness of jurisdiction. Even when the defendant 
has continuous and systematic volitional ties with the forum, jurisdiction is denied 
if the plaintiff’s claim lacks sufficient connection with those contacts. 
In fact, the subjugation of the fairness factors is even starker than that. In 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, the defendant’s counsel admitted at oral argument that 
litigation in California was not inconvenient for the defendant. Thus, we have a 
case in which the defendant has continuous and systematic contact with the forum 
and in which the defendant admits the reasonableness of jurisdiction. The 
reasonableness of jurisdiction—even if admitted—is simply irrelevant. All is 
subservient to two very high barriers for specific jurisdiction: contact and 
relatedness. 
VI. THE SCORECARD 
Justice Black feared that International Shoe would be used to restrict personal 
jurisdiction. At the time, his concern must have seemed odd. After all, the rigid, 
power-based regime of Pennoyer v. Neff was being supplemented (if not replaced) 
by a flexible, pragmatic balancing test. Surely considerations of “fair play and 
substantial justice” would support jurisdiction beyond that permitted by the 
cramped historical view. 
But Justice Black was on to something. The new era is startlingly restrictive—
in fact and in tenor. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre is a 
throwback to Pennoyer, with its emphasis on territoriality and on the need for a 
defendant to “submit” to jurisdiction.83 Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Bristol-
Myers Squibb sounds quite similar, with an emphasis on interstate federalism. 
While Kennedy spoke for only three others, Alito’s opinion in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb was signed by all but Sotomayor. General jurisdiction is narrower than it 
has been in two generations. The failure of specific jurisdiction to pull its weight 
is manifested by J. McIntyre, in which American courts are closed to American 
citizens injured while on the job for American companies. 
Interestingly, though, Justice Black’s reasoning was incorrect. The limited 
 
83.  See Miller, supra note 62, at 748 (“The language is somewhat reminiscent of the Court’s opinion 134 
years earlier in Pennoyer v. Neff.”). 
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state of modern doctrine is not the result of findings that jurisdiction would violate 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Rather, it was caused by 
the modern obsession with avoiding any assessment of the fairness of jurisdiction. 
International Shoe seemed revolutionary in injecting open-ended considerations 
of state’s interest and convenience. Those factors often will support jurisdiction, 
as they did in Justice Black’s hands in Travelers Health and McGee. 
Factors of reasonableness and fairness can only support jurisdiction, however, 
if a court will consider them. And the Court has raised two barricades to avoid their 
leavening effect. One is the requirement that a defendant’s contact with the forum 
result from the defendant’s own purposeful availment. She must target the state in 
some way, in the view of four justices in J. McIntyre, “submitting” to jurisdiction. 
Without that contact, the fairness factors are irrelevant. The second hurdle is 
coming into focus because of the curtailment of general jurisdiction: the 
requirement of relatedness. Even if there is contact, the plaintiff’s claim must be 
sufficiently related to that contact. Without relatedness, the fairness factors are 
irrelevant. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Justice Black wisely understood that open-ended considerations of fairness 
could and should be used to support the exercise of judicial authority. That wisdom 
has been lost because those considerations are now off the table. The modern 
Court84 has managed to render them irrelevant. The state of personal jurisdiction 
is sclerotic today not because of the fairness factors, but despite them. Justice Black 
was right, but for the wrong reason. 
 
84.  Professor Vitiello argues that various modern restrictions to court access result from right-wing judicial 
activism on the Court. See, e.g., VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 64–71. Interestingly, though, some key restrictions on 
personal jurisdiction doctrine were inflicted by liberal Justices. Justice Brennan gave us the presumption in Burger 
King that renders access to fairness factors so difficult. And Justice Ginsburg, author of all three new-era general 
jurisdiction decisions, has led the charge to eviscerate general jurisdiction. She has not made clear why she 
considered this move appropriate or necessary. 
